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A B S T R A C T
As elsewhere in the world, Africa has experienced a rise in litigation against
transnational corporations for adverse environmental and social impact. Cape plc
and RTZ have been sued in British courts for environmental damage and for
breach of employment rights in Africa. Companies which sold products to South
Africa’s former apartheid regime, such as Fujitsu and IBM, are now being sued in
US courts. Shell and Chevron are being sued in US courts for human rights
abuses in Nigeria. At the same time, foreign ﬁrms have been successfully sued in
African courts for social and environmental damage. This article outlines the
main relevant court cases and attempts to assess the signiﬁcance of this litigation.
The discussion of litigation in this article is divided into three parts : court cases
ﬁled in English, American and African (mainly Nigerian) courts. This is followed
by an explanation of the triggers of legal change, a discussion of the impact of
litigation and the conclusion.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
As elsewhere in the world, Africa has experienced a rise in litigation
against transnational corporations (TNCs) for adverse environmental and
social impact. Cape plc and RTZ have been sued in British courts for
environmental damage and breach of employment rights in Africa.
Companies which sold products to South Africa’s former apartheid re-
gime, such as Fujitsu, UBS and IBM, are now being sued in US courts.
Shell and Chevron are being sued in US courts for human rights abuses in
Nigeria. At the same time, foreign ﬁrms have been successfully sued in
African courts for social and environmental damage (see Table 1).
This rise should be seen in the context of changing global governance
and the rise of corporate social responsibility (CSR). As Newell (2001) has
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TA B L E 1
Summary of the most important Africa related lawsuits against TNCs
Start of Court
Action Companies Sued
Place of
Injury
Forum of
Litigation Cause of Action Outcome
1989 Royal Dutch/Shell Nigeria Nigeria Damage from oil well blowout Claimants won in 1994
1994 RTZ Namibia England Damage from uranium Action allowed in English
court, but claimant lost in 1999
1994 Thor Chemicals South Africa England Damage from mercury Out-of-court settlements in 1997 and 2000
1996 Royal Dutch/Shell Nigeria United States Complicity in human rights
abuses by government
security forces
Pending
1997 Cape plc South Africa England Damage from asbestos Out-of-court settlements
in 2001 and 2003
1999 Chevron Nigeria United States Complicity in human rights
abuses by government
security forces
Pending
2001 Talisman Energy Sudan United States Complicity in human rights
abuses by government
security forces
Pending
2002 Citigroup, Deutsche Bank,
Ford, Fujitsu, General
Motors, ICL, IBM
and others
South Africa United States Complicity in human rights
abuses by government
security forces
Pending
2002 Gencor South Africa South Africa Damage from asbestos Out-of-court settlement in 2003
suggested, litigation can assume a role ‘ in creating checks and balances on
the activities of global corporations where globalization creates oppor-
tunities for exploiting the lack of protection of the poor and their environ-
ment’. In other words, litigation presents a strategy to hold TNCs
accountable for adverse environmental and social impact in the absence of
eﬀective international policing.
As Dicken (1998: 271) observed, one of the most striking developments
in international business in the last few decades has been an intensiﬁcation
in competitive bidding between states (or between communities within
states) for internationally mobile investment. TNCs can exploit regulatory
diﬀerences between states by re-locating some of their manufacturing
plants from one country to another, or by shifting the sourcing of their
supplies to a diﬀerent country with a more advantageous regulatory re-
gime; this is termed ‘regulatory arbitrage’ (Leyshon 1992). TNCs may be
able to play oﬀ one government against another, as states compete against
each other to attract foreign investment by oﬀering the best incentive
packages. In addition to providing ﬁnancial aid or favourable taxation
rates for foreign investors, national governments may also be reluctant to
impose environmental and social regulations on ﬁrms.
Like national governments, intergovernmental organisations are also
reluctant to impose regulations on ﬁrms. The United Nations Centre for
Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) was set up in 1973, and embarked
on formulating an international code of conduct to regulate the activi-
ties of TNCs. But the Centre was closed in 1993 after twenty years of
failed negotiations. In place of binding international commitments,
intergovernmental organisations focused on voluntary agreements, self-
monitoring by ﬁrms and social audits performed by external consul-
tants (Newell 2000). The European Commission Communication of July
2002, which forms the basis for the European Strategy on CSR, has ﬁrmly
rejected a regulatory approach to CSR (website : EC). It makes clear that
it does not at present intend to impose responsible behaviour on com-
panies by regulation or directive.
It should be noted that there are clear international standards and even
binding international law in a number of areas such as labour rights (no-
tably the International Labour Organisation conventions) or human rights
generally (e.g. UN International Covenants), but their enforcement is at
best patchy. As Meyer (2003: 43) has argued, ‘The hardest job in creating
an eﬀective [international normative] regime for TNCs remains to be
done. ’ The world’s most powerful global economic institutions – the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) – have contributed much towards creating more
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freedom for TNCs in international trade and investment, inter alia, by
forcing nation-states to open up their economies, to change legislation to
oﬀer equal treatment to TNCs or (in the case of the World Bank) chan-
nelling capital directly to ﬁrms (Mellahi et al. forthcoming). At the same
time, these institutions have done little to strengthen environmental or
labour rights regimes; indeed, they (notably the WTO) have undermined
the right of nation-states to impose environmental or labour rights pro-
visions (Korten 1995: 174–9).
As a consequence of regulatory arbitrage and the absence of eﬀective
global institutions to enforce standards, ﬁrms may re-locate to other
countries because of lower legal social and environmental standards (e.g.
Thor Chemicals’ re-location of mercury-related processes from the UK to
South Africa). Even when such threat is not imminent, the executive
branch of the government may be reluctant to implement its own social
and environmental provisions and to prosecute corporate oﬀenders (e.g. in
the case of asbestos mining in South Africa) (Ward 2002). Therefore, liti-
gation presents victims of corporate crime with an avenue for holding
ﬁrms accountable for their actions. In this context, the enthusiasm of in-
dividuals and non-governmental organisations for using litigation against
ﬁrms cannot come as a surprise.
This article outlines the main relevant court cases at present, and
attempts to assess the signiﬁcance of this litigation. The discussion of
litigation in this article is divided into three parts – court cases ﬁled in
English, American and African (mainly Nigerian) courts. This is followed
by an explanation of the triggers of legal change, a discussion of the impact
of litigation and the conclusion.
L I T I G A T I O N I N E N G L I S H C O U R T S
1
The 1990s saw a rise in litigation in English courts against large TNCs for
social and environmental damage caused during business operations in
African countries. I shall start by summarising the relevant cases.
Connelly v. RTZ (1994–1999)
This case involved a Scottish man who had worked for RUL – a subsidi-
ary of RTZ – at their uranium mine in Namibia. He contracted laryngeal
cancer aged 32 and underwent a laryngectomy. This case went to the
House of Lords where it was held in 1997 that, while Namibia was a more
appropriate venue for the claim, it would not be in the interests of justice
to make Mr Connelly litigate his claim in Namibia because there was no
funding for his case in Namibia (website : House of Lords).
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Lawsuits against Thor Chemicals (1994–2000)
In this instance, seventeen South African workers, and the representatives
of three workers who had died by the start of proceedings in October 1994,
sued Thor Chemical Holdings and its chairman in an English court in two
lawsuits. The workers claimed to have suﬀered from mercury poisoning
and demanded compensation from the company. In April 1997, the claims
were settled out of court for £1.3 million. A third claim was ﬁled in
February 1998 by a further twenty-one workers ; this was settled for
£240,000 in October 2000 (see Ward 2002).
Lubbe v. Cape plc (1997–2003)
This case concerned thousands of former Cape plc workers in South
Africa who suﬀered from asbestos-related illnesses. Cape plc has had no
presence in South Africa since 1989. A claim was brought to an English
court by two former Cape plc workers and three residents living nearby
exposed to asbestos, who were able to obtain legal aid in the UK. In 1999
further claims were issued by over 1,500 claimants ; by the time the judg-
ment was handed down from the House of Lords in July 2000, over 3,000
people were part of the suit and about 100 had already died. The House of
Lords stated that the suit should be tried in England, as ‘ the plaintiﬀs
would have no means of obtaining the professional representation and the
expert evidence’ in South Africa (website : House of Lords; Ward 2002). In
December 2001, the claimants (over 7,500 people by now) agreed on a
settlement whereby Cape plc was to pay £21 million into a trust fund, but
the company failed to honour the settlement. Further litigation ensued
and the South African mining company Gencor was added as a defendant
alongside Cape (Gencor had acquired assets that were previously owned
by Cape). In a new settlement in March 2003, Cape and Gencor agreed to
pay a total of £7.5 million and £3.21 million respectively in compensation
to the 7,500 registered claimants.2
Whilst the number of court cases has so far been relatively limited,
this litigation was signiﬁcant in that English courts allowed claimants to
use their forums for adjudicating disputes between Africans (including
African claimants and African subsidiaries of foreign ﬁrms) for injuries
suﬀered in Africa. The House of Lords focused on the question of ‘a denial
of justice ’ (website : House of Lords). While the judges did not argue
that the claimants could generally bring cases to English courts if justice
could not be obtained in their home country, the ﬁnding that the
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claimants in these speciﬁc circumstances could sue in the UK was signiﬁ-
cant.
Beyond allowing some types of cases to be brought to English courts,
the litigation has challenged the received wisdom on how ﬁrms may
escape transnational litigation. The legal structure of companies tends
to protect parent companies from claims brought against aﬃliates, since
separate companies are regarded as being separate legal entities and their
ﬁnancial liability is limited up to the amount of the parent company’s
investment in the aﬃliate’s shares (cf. Magaisa 2001). But the English
courts have now and again worked around this old doctrine, which has
enormous implications. Nor can ﬁrms necessarily protect themselves
against lawsuits by going out of business or limiting the parent–subsidiary
links. By the time the third court case against Thor Chemicals had been
ﬁled, the Thor Group had conducted a de-merger and all except three
aﬃliates had been transferred to a new parent company. Thor Chemicals
Holdings was left with three companies and only Thor South Africa – now
renamed Guernica SA – was still trading several years later. Yet, the
Court of Appeal ruled in September 2000 that the 1997 demerger may
have been initiated to put the group’s assets beyond the reach of claim-
ants ; subsequently, Thor Chemicals Holdings was forced to disclose
documents on its de-merger and to pay £400,000 into court if it wanted to
continue being part of the action (Ward 2002). Certain previous business
strategies, which relied on complex organisational structures to escape
legal liability for damage, may thus no longer be as eﬀective as they used
to be.
Nonetheless, litigation in the UK against ﬁrms operating in Africa or
other regions has certain limitations. There are limitations on class action
suits, the type of claims that can be brought, and the type of claimants who
can bring cases. The legal outcome is highly uncertain, and claims can
only be brought against companies domiciled in the UK. Finally, the
awards of compensation are not always very high, especially when com-
pared with the United States. It is therefore perhaps not surprising that the
focus of transnational litigation shifted from the UK towards the United
States in the late 1990s.
L I T I G A T I O N I N US C O U R T S
Beginning with a case against Royal Dutch/Shell in 1996, a number of
high proﬁle cases have been brought against TNCs in US courts for injury
caused during African operations. I start by summarising the most im-
portant US cases.
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Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell (ongoing since 1996 )
A lawsuit was ﬁled by relatives of the murdered Ogoni leader Ken Saro-
Wiwa and other Nigerians, alleging Shell’s complicity in the hanging of
Ken Saro-Wiwa and John Kpuinen, two leaders of the Movement for the
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), and the torture and detention of
Owens Wiwa. The suit was amended in 1997 to include another claimant
who alleged, amongst others, that she was shot by Nigerian troops called
in by Shell while she was peacefully protesting the destruction of her crops.
A second case was also ﬁled against the former head of Shell’s Nigerian
subsidiary (website : CCR).
Bowoto v. Chevron (ongoing since 1999)
In this instance, representatives of several Nigerian communities are suing
Chevron for the company’s alleged involvement in three machine-gun
attacks on unarmed environmental protesters and people in their homes in
Nigeria between May 1998 and January 1999. Chevron is alleged to have
provided helicopters and various large boats, along with pilots and other
crew, for use by the Nigerian military on two separate occasions. The
alleged Chevron-aided intervention by the Nigerian military is said to
have resulted in unarmed protestors being killed and injured (website :
CCR).
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy (ongoing since 2001)
In November 2001, the Presbyterian Church of Sudan and three individ-
ual plaintiﬀs ﬁled a lawsuit against the Canadian oil company Talisman
Energy, alleging the company’s complicity in ethnic cleansing of non-
Muslim minorities by the Sudanese government in Southern Sudan,
where Talisman had been exploring for oil. The suit alleges that the
military campaign against the local population was ‘possible only through
Defendant’s collaboration’, that Talisman requested military intervention,
and that the ﬁrm provided the military with logistical support (such as
Talisman-built or maintained roads and airﬁelds) and ﬁnancial support
(such as funds for the training of government security personnel in Canada
and more indirect payments to the government) (website : iAbolish).
Lawsuits against foreign ﬁrms in South Africa (ongoing since 2002)
Two sets of lawsuits were ﬁled against numerous US, Japanese, German
and other companies on behalf of South Africans who faced persecution
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under apartheid. The claimants allege that the companies, which include
well-known names such as Fujitsu, Citigroup and Deutsche Bank, acted in
deﬁance of international law and participated in crimes against humanity
when supporting South Africa’s apartheid regime. The lawsuits seek for
those ﬁrms to invest in and to develop disadvantaged communities, to pay
billions of dollars in compensation to individuals, and to cancel debt in-
herited from the apartheid era. Firms are alleged to have ignored United
Nations appeals to shun the apartheid regime and to have sustained the
regime by providing loans, goods and export markets. For instance, ICL
and IBM are named in the lawsuits because they allegedly supplied com-
puters which tracked apartheid’s opponents, while the car makers Ford
and General Motors are said to have sold armoured vehicles which
patrolled townships and from which police shot unarmed protesters.3
Litigation against corporations in the United States has grown quickly
since 1996, owing largely to the successful application of an ancient legal
statute called the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which was originally
passed as part of the 1789 Judiciary Act to allow victims of oﬀshore piracy
to sue onshore. Whilst previously ATCA had been used to sue individuals
in US courts with regard to human rights abuses, the case of Doe v. Unocal
pioneered the use of the statute to sue corporations for social and en-
vironmental damage committed outside the United States. In that case, a
US court ruled in 1996 that the US ﬁrm Unocal could be sued in US
courts for complicity in human rights abuses committed by Burmese
authorities. In both the Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell and the Bowoto v. Chevron
cases, the courts have already aﬃrmed that ATCA applies and that both
companies can be sued over their complicity in human rights abuses in
Nigeria (both cases are still pending).
As with cases brought to English courts, the litigation in the United
States is signiﬁcant in that it has challenged the received wisdom on how
ﬁrms may escape transnational litigation. In the Wiwa v. Royal Dutch/Shell
case, Shell lawyers initially submitted hundreds of pages of evidence which
aimed to demonstrate that Shell’s US subsidiary was autonomous from its
parent companies in the UK and the Netherlands.4 Indeed, Shell’s US
subsidiary has had more autonomy from the parent companies than Shell
subsidiaries in other countries (although it was still 100% owned by the
parent companies). Yet Shell’s corporate structure could no longer protect
Shell from the suit.
From a corporate perspective, American cases present a greater threat
to corporations than English cases. The law appears to provide greater
remedies and the potential compensation awards are much larger.
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Furthermore, unlike in the UK where only UK-based TNCs were aﬀec-
ted, claimants can sue non-American ﬁrms in US courts, so that any TNC
with suﬃcient presence in the United States could be exposed to legal
claims arising anywhere in the world.
L I T I G A T I O N I N A F R I C A N C O U R T S
At the same time as transnational litigation has developed in the UK and
the United States, some domestic courts in Africa have begun to broaden
the legal liability of corporations. In the 1990s, a large number of court
cases were brought against transnational oil corporations including Shell,
Total (formerly Elf ), Chevron and others in Nigerian courts. Unlike law-
suits in English and American courts, where we could discuss each indi-
vidual lawsuit, the court cases in Nigeria can be counted by the dozens or
even the hundreds. During the period 1981–86, twenty-four compensation
claims against Shell went to court in Nigeria (Adewale 1989: 93). In early
1998, Shell was reportedly involved in over 500 pending court cases in
Nigeria, of which 70% or roughly 350 cases dealt with oil spills, the other
30% or 150 cases mostly with other types of damage from oil operations,
contracts, employment and taxation. Chevron, which reportedly only had
up to 50 court cases in Nigeria in the whole of the 1980s, was in early 1998
involved in over 200 cases, of which 80–90% or roughly 160–180 cases
dealt with oil spills, other types of damage from oil operations, or land
acquisition for oil operations.5 The following two court cases serve as
examples.
Shell v. Farah (1989–94)
In this instance, several families sued Shell for compensation from an oil
well blowout in 1970. It took the oil company several weeks to bring the
situation under control. Meanwhile, oil and other substances had polluted
the adjoining land. Crops and trees were destroyed, while the farming
land was rendered infertile. Shell had promised to rehabilitate a land area
of 13.2 hectares and to hand the land back to the community afterwards.
To facilitate land rehabilitation, the community vacated the land. Some 18
years after the blowout, in March 1988, Shell wrote a letter to the claim-
ants’ solicitor claiming that the land had already been rehabilitated and
‘handed back’ to the claimants (NWLR 1995). Moreover, Shell claimed
that it had paid £22,000 in compensation for damaged crops, trees and
other objects and another £1,000 for damage to the land. However, the
company had broken its promise and rehabilitation had not been carried
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out. In the meantime, the local people could neither farm nor use the land
in any other way. The claimants alleged that they had never received any
compensation for damage to the land. The families involved ﬁnally en-
gaged in litigation in 1989 and the Court of Appeal awarded them c. 4.6
million Naira (c. US$210,000 at the oﬃcial exchange rate) in 1994.
Shell v. Tiebo VII (1987–96 )
In this suit, representatives of a Nigerian community sued Shell for dam-
age from an oil spill in 1987. The oil spill polluted a river, which had
previously been used as a source of fresh water and for ﬁshing. Members of
the community who drank the water after the spill suﬀered from water-
borne diseases. In addition, the oil spill damaged swampland, streams,
ﬁshponds and religious shrines. Shell did not deny the oil spill, but claimed
that it had only aﬀected an area of about 2.3 hectares of seasonal swamp
and ﬁsh ﬂats. It oﬀered the community 5,500 Naira as ‘ fair and adequate
compensation’ (NWLR 1996). The Court of Appeal awarded the claim-
ants 6 million Naira in compensation (c. US$275,000 at the oﬃcial
exchange rate).
Litigation against oil companies in Nigeria has quickly grown since 1994,
owing partly to the legal precedent created in the Shell v. Farah case, which
signiﬁcantly increased the quantum of compensation awarded to claim-
ants in suits against oil companies. A comparison of compensation
awards before and after the Farah case tentatively illustrates the rise in
compensation payments (see Table 2). The Farah case helped to justify
higher compensation payments, but it was accompanied by other devel-
opments such as slightly relaxed rules of evidence, amongst others. As
analysed elsewhere (Frynas 1999; Frynas 2000: ch. 6), the Farah case was
part of a more general legal change in Nigeria’s tort law, which rendered it
easier to successfully sue oil companies.
At this stage, it should be pointed out that Nigeria is not alone in pion-
eering social and environmental litigation against TNCs. Developments
in South Africa are also notable. In early 2003, South African miners
suﬀering from exposure to asbestos accepted a 418 million rand (over US$
63 million at March 2004 rates) settlement from Gencor, which had been
sued in South African courts (FT 14.3.2003). Another asbestos-related case
was Manchonyane v. Duiker Mining launched in 2003, in which a former
worker of Duiker Mining (aﬃliate of the Swiss mining ﬁrm Xstrata) sued
the ﬁrm alleging a work-related illness due to asbestos exposure.6 Further
South African lawsuits were launched or planned.
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The rise of litigation against TNCs in African courts is less signiﬁcant
than transnational litigation in the sense that African compensation
awards are considerably smaller than potential awards in English or US
courts. While several of the pending Nigerian and South African cases
have a prospect of obtaining millions of dollars in compensation, court
cases in the United States could potentially lead to compensation awards
in the range of billions of dollars. Therefore, corporate managers tend to
perceive US litigation as much more threatening than domestic litigation
in Africa, and, to a lesser extent, English or Australian. In an attempt
to avoid litigation in the UK, Cape lawyers approached a law centre
in Johannesburg asking whether the centre would be interested in co-
ordinating litigation in South Africa on behalf of the claimants, and
indicated that Cape might be willing to make money available to fund
a lawsuit against itself in South Africa (Ward 2002).
Nonetheless, litigation in African courts is signiﬁcant, demonstrating
that social and environmental litigation is not solely a Western phenom-
enon. The liability of TNCs seems to be on the minds of African lawyers
and African judges, and we are likely to witness more attempts to sue
corporations in African courts.
L A W A S S Y M P T O M O F S O C I A L C H A N G E
The growth of litigation against TNCs suggests that courts have become
more responsive to those aﬀected by corporate acts. As one observer
T A B L E 2
Compensation awards in selected oil-related lawsuits in Nigeria
Year of
Judgment Court Case
Payment
Awarded
(000s Naira)
Payment
Awarded (US$)
Payment Awarded as
Share of Claim (%)
1972 Mon v. Shell-BP 0.2 304 0.1
1975 Umudje v. Shell-BP 12 19,481 24
1978 Fufeyin v. Shell-BP 56 88,189 100
1978 Shell-BP v. Cole 35 55,118 n.a.
1994 Shell v. Farah 4,621 210,084 17
1996 Shell v. Tiebo VII 6,000 274,173 9
1996 Shell v. Udi 39 1,782 78
1997 Geosource v. Biragbara 197 9,001 10
1997 Shell v. Isaiah 22,000 1,005,208 100
Source : Field work in Nigeria; oﬃcial currency exchange rates were derived from IMF International
Financial Statistics (various years).
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remarked with regard to English litigation, ‘Certainly after Connelly case
and now the landmark Lubbe judgment, one can safely say that the House
of Lords has been positively victim-friendly ’ (Magaisa 2001). Yet little
attempt has been made by either academics or journalists to explain
why this has come about.
Based on extensive ﬁeldwork on Nigerian litigation, I have identiﬁed
two key factors, which help to explain this change in legal approach: the
increased professional ability of legal counsel working for claimants, and
the impact of changing social attitudes on judges. These factors also help
to explain litigation in English and US courts.
First, one can detect an increased professional ability of legal counsel in
both Western and African litigation against TNCs. A key law ﬁrm in the
English cases against Thor Chemicals and Cape was Leigh, Day & Co., a
London-based ﬁrm with considerable experience in public interest liti-
gation and a commitment to social justice aims. The landmark case
against Unocal in the United States, as well as the Nigeria-related cases
against Shell and Chevron, were brought by the Centre for Constitutional
Rights, a New York based pressure group devoted to new ‘progressive’
approaches to law, which has distinguished American lawyers aiding its
work. One set of the anti-apartheid lawsuits in US courts was ﬁled by the
Khulumani Support Group, which formed part of Jubilee SA, the local
aﬃliate of a global pressure group campaigning for the cancellation of
Third World debt. In turn, the anti-apartheid suits were aided by US
lawyers Michael Hausfeld and Ed Fagan,7 who were previously involved
in suits that won a US$1.25 billion claim against Swiss banks for victims of
the holocaust, and a US$5 billion claim to compensate slave labourers in
Germany during the Second World War. In other words, the rise of anti-
corporate litigation was greatly helped by expertise and support from
non-governmental groups, law chambers and individuals committed to a
remaking of the law with regard to greater corporate liability.
The African cases can be partly explained on those grounds. The South
African cases mentioned earlier were brought by Richard Spoor, a South
African public interest lawyer who previously worked with Leigh, Day &
Co. on the Cape suit in the UK (Ward 2002). The landmark case Shell v.
Farah, which opened the doors for larger compensation awards in Nigeria,
was brought by Ledum Mittee, a Port Harcourt based lawyer and one of
the principal leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni
People (MOSOP), which campaigned against Shell in Nigeria.8 One must
add that the vast majority of the Nigerian court cases against transnational
oil companies were brought by lawyers attracted by the ﬁnancial rewards
of oil-related litigation. Lawyers in anti-corporate cases in Nigeria work on
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a contingency fee ; they work for ‘ free ’ for their client during the legal
proceedings, but in return demand a high share of the compensation
payment (which can be as much as half of it), if the suit succeeds (cf. Frynas
2000: 109). Nonetheless, whether individuals have been driven by their
moral principles or the prospect of ﬁnancial rewards, social and environ-
mental litigation against TNCs has come to attract lawyers who are both
highly motivated and experienced in their profession.
The cumulative eﬀect of the involvement of pressure groups and
reward-seeking lawyers is that lawyers in anti-corporate lawsuits are more
innovative and pro-active in court proceedings. Lawyers attempt new
tactics to bring corporations to court, notably the successful pioneering
attempt by the Centre for Constitutional Rights to use ATCA for suing
corporations in US courts. It is not entirely clear to what extent the legal
innovations in the 1990s have been induced or aided by the sophisticated
and innovative use of legal rules by lawyers working for the claimants. But
there are examples which indicate that the judge’s views on the legal issues
involved in a case and expressed in a court judgment reﬂect arguments in
the lawyer’s brief.
The second crucial explanation for a changing legal approach rests with
the judicial oﬃcers, who pronounce judgments against corporations. A
reading of court transcripts reveals a greater willingness by judges to re-
interpret legal statutes and case law to the detriment of corporations. In
the Nigerian cases against oil companies, the Nigerian Court of Appeal
broadened the interpretation of the principle ‘restitutio in integrum’ (i.e.
the principle of restoring the claimant to the position he/she enjoyed be-
fore the injury occurred) by awarding the claimants certain compensation
payments, which would not have been awarded only a few years earlier (cf.
Frynas 2000: 211–13). In the English cases discussed earlier, the House of
Lords put a greater emphasis on the issue of access to courts when ruling
on claims brought by claimants who were injured in Africa. It is unlikely
that this shift is purely accidental ; I suggest that it reﬂects the impact of
changing social attitudes on the judges.
Campaigns by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), media reports
about the damage inﬂicted by corporations, and social change more gen-
erally, have made judges more responsive to those injured by corporate
acts. As the public has increasingly come to accept that corporations
should pay greater attention to and be responsible for the eﬀects of their
operations, judges have inevitably been aﬀected by this shift. For instance,
in the Nigerian context, media reports and activist campaigns related to
the Ogoni people made judges more aware of the plight of local com-
munities aﬀected by oil operations and aﬀected the outcome of oil-related
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litigation. This insight was greatly helped by M. B. Belgore, Chief Justice
of Nigeria’s Federal High Court (interview 1998), who said:
Judges of today have seen a lot more development than twenty years ago. They
are more aware now of oil industry problems than thirty years ago … As one
American jurist said, the current aﬀair doesn’t pass by the judges. The judge
cannot be isolated from what is currently going on in society in line with a par-
ticular subject.
The changing social attitudes of judicial oﬃcers can directly aﬀect court
judgments. They can, for instance, help to explain the higher compen-
sation payments awarded to those aﬀected by oil operations in Nigeria.
Said Belgore, CJ:
While the law is there, the human element counts in the judge’s discretion. If
there is compensation and maybe the plaintiﬀs claim 5 million Naira, you cannot
award 5 million but, at the same time, you cannot award 500 Naira. You go in-
between and that’s where the discretion and the sympathy of the judge comes in.
Changing social attitudes are probably the key explanation for legal
change. As Kermit Hall (1989: 245–6) observed, the business of the courts
mirrors the economic and social changes brought by economic develop-
ment, while judges play a part in allocating the costs, risks and beneﬁts of
this development. Even if the skill of legal counsel improves or government
regulations change, a judge will not use his or her discretion in favour of
one party unless he or she is convinced of the merits of a particular allo-
cation. In that sense, legal change in litigation against TNCs has to be
ultimately rooted in social attitudes towards the allocation of the social
costs and beneﬁts arising from corporate acts.
T H E I M P A C T O F L I T I G A T I O N
Litigation against foreign ﬁrms has potential repercussions for Africa’s
economic development as well as for its societies at large, so it becomes
instructive to assess its costs and beneﬁts. At this stage, an assessment of the
impact of social and environmental litigation is very diﬃcult, if not im-
possible. As Ward (2003) pointed out, ‘ the legal signals are by no means
always clear – particularly where frontier legal actions are concerned’.
There have been only a limited number of court judgments until now, and
their future interpretation by judges takes us even further into the realm of
speculation. None of the high-proﬁle cases in the US courts (where the
potential compensation payments are much higher than elsewhere) have
yet been decided, so the potential impact of litigation cannot be gauged in
its entirety. Furthermore, since litigation frequently forms part of a larger
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activist campaign against a speciﬁc company, it is often impossible to dis-
aggregate the impact of litigation from the impact of other forms of activist
campaigning on the ﬁrm’s public perception or its share price. For in-
stance, Talisman’s decision to sell its Sudanese assets in late 2002 may
have been partly inﬂuenced by the lawsuit in the United States, but activist
campaigns and political risk (and the ﬁrm’s lower share value related to
investments in Sudan) were other compelling inﬂuences, whilst top man-
agement is unlikely to ever disclose its precise motivations. Finally, the
impact of litigation may diﬀer widely, notably between diﬀerent ﬁrms (e.g.
due to industry sector or nationality).
Keeping in mind the above caveats, I concentrate on outlining the
potential impact of litigation and try to identify some key factors which may
aﬀect the intensity of that impact. In order to structure this discussion, I
distinguish between the economic and the developmental impact of liti-
gation. This analysis considers the pros and cons of litigation from four
diﬀerent perspectives : the aﬀected ﬁrms, the represented claimants, the
national economy, and the society as a whole. The discussion reveals that
the cons of litigation far outweigh the pros.
The potential economic impact on ﬁrms is largely negative, as litigation
creates commercial risks and costs for foreign ﬁrms, which have invested
or are planning to invest in Africa. Litigation creates a legal liability risk,
i.e. the risk of becoming liable for social and environmental damage. In
extreme cases, this risk can prevent a potential investor from committing
funds to an African country. More typically, a liability risk can increase
costs in terms of higher insurance premiums or higher cost of capital. The
capital markets react speedily to legal outcomes. On the day when the
House of Lords judgment against Cape was made, Cape’s shares dropped
to £0.405, down from £0.550 the evening before (Ward 2001).
The potential impact of transnational litigation can be deduced from
past experience of social and environmental litigation in the United States.
As The Economist (24.3.2001) reported, Moody’s credit-rating agency
downgraded twenty-two US companies in 2000 alone, at least in part
because of litigation risk involving claims related to issues such as asbestos
and anti-trust allegations. Even the largest corporations may be aﬀected;
for instance, the chemical company Dow Corning ﬁled for bankruptcy
in 1995 under the weight of litigation related to breast implants. ‘Be-
cause litigation risk is diﬃcult to analyse, when the ﬁnancial markets do
wake up to these concerns they often panic ’, The Economist continued. The
development of US litigation with regard to domestic legal claims is
perhaps a warning to corporate managers with regard to transnational
claims.
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Nonetheless, the liability risk in Africa should not be exaggerated, as the
number of cases is relatively small and the chances of success for ﬁrms are
high (especially in the transnational litigation in US and English courts).
Most of the cases – except for the anti-apartheid lawsuits in the United
States – have focused on ‘dirty industries ’ which cause above-average
pollution, including oil, mining and chemicals. The litigation risk for a
European brewer or an Asian textile manufacturer in Africa appears to be
insigniﬁcant at the moment.
Given the publicity that litigation generates, a much more important
issue appears to be reputational risk, i.e. the risk of damage to reputation.
As Newell (2001) pointed out, the ‘ impact of bringing or threatening to
bring cases will often be more important than the legal outcome’. NGOs,
local community groups and individuals are often less interested in win-
ning the legal arguments, but rather pursue litigation as a means to an
end. Newell (2001) indicated that litigation has sometimes been brought
against TNCs in order to buy time to mobilise resistance around a project,
to demonstrate inequities in existing laws, or to seek oﬃcial acknowledg-
ment of crimes, which otherwise would not be acknowledged.
A legal victory by a company several years down the line may not
compensate for the adverse publicity generated by a lawsuit. Media pub-
licity is the key weapon in the armour of pressure groups, with litigation
being a vehicle for mobilising the media for a given cause. In an age where
corporate brand reputations are crucial for ﬁrm success, adverse publicity
has the potential to inﬂict major damage on the brand name. Therefore,
the impact of litigation on ﬁrms is multidimensional. But it should be
pointed out at this point that reputational risk may vary by ﬁrm size, brand
importance or nationality. A large ﬁrm with a major brand name from the
UK or the United States is likely to be more exposed than a small and
relatively unknown Malaysian or Chinese ﬁrm.
The potential economic impact on national economies is also largely negative,
as litigation (via either legal liability risk or reputational risk to ﬁrms) could
result in a reduced ﬂow of investment to African countries in certain
sectors. The current litigation in African as well as British and US
courts focuses on extractive industries including oil and mining, which are
Africa’s key attraction to foreign investors. Of the court cases discussed,
most are related to the oil industry which attracts the biggest share of
Africa’s foreign investment. From this perspective, African economies with
their high dependence on raw material exports have potentially more
to lose than Asian or Latin American countries, which have more
diversiﬁed economies and sources of foreign investment.9
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Even if successful litigation were not to result in lower absolute levels of
investment, it may deter the most technically competent or experienced
ﬁrms from investing in a country. The Sudanese oil industry oﬀers
an example. While we do not know to what extent litigation prompted
Talisman to sell its Sudanese assets, activist campaigns against Talisman
and other Western ﬁrms have deterred other experienced oil ﬁrms from
investing in the Sudan. At present, no Western oil company operates
in Sudan, having been replaced by less experienced Malaysian, Chinese
and Indian oil ﬁrms (Human Rights Watch 2003).
At a minimum, litigation could render commercial operations more
costly, for instance, through higher cost of capital for infrastructure pro-
jects such as hydroelectric dams or other projects which may be con-
sidered risky from a legal or ‘ethical ’ perspective. African economies
already suﬀer from high transaction costs (poor infrastructure such as
transportation, underdeveloped capital markets etc.), so the risk of liti-
gation would not pose a new economic barrier ; yet it could potentially
aggravate already existing problems. Nonetheless, the potential impact of
litigation on African economies is likely to be small. Countries with high
dependence on oil or mineral investment could be more aﬀected. How-
ever, the examples of Nigeria and Sudan demonstrate that investment in
extractive industries may continue unabated despite very serious political
and social instability, and despite considerable international public press-
ure to divest.
While the economic impact of litigation is largely negative, litigation
can bring beneﬁts to the represented claimants and the society as a whole.
The developmental impact on represented claimants has many positive facets.
Claimants may obtain ﬁnancial compensation for past injuries and losses.
Those claimants who require continuous medical attention (e.g. those who
suﬀer from asbestos-related illnesses) may obtain funds for the medical
treatment they require. Claimants may also get the mental satisfaction
of obtaining ‘ justice ’ by having the corporate ‘wrongs’ acknowledged in
public. But the remedies available to courts may not always satisfy the
claimants. Lawsuits brought under tort law reduce social issues to ques-
tions of compensation, but sometimes this is not entirely appropriate. For
example, if a company destroys a religious shrine in the course of its
business operations, the injury may not be easy to compensate ; indeed,
what is the monetary value of a shrine?
The ultimate weapon of courts is to order an end to a harmful activity,
but courts have been reluctant to use that weapon. Nigerian courts forced
oil companies to make sizable compensation payments to claimants, but
failed to put any injunctions in place in order to stop harmful gas ﬂaring,
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or to force ﬁrms to upgrade their facilities before resumption of oil pro-
duction (Frynas 1999). In extreme cases, the costs of potential future liti-
gation could discourage ﬁrms from continuing with a harmful activity in a
community and prompt a ﬁrm’s withdrawal. But the local community
may often want the company to stay rather than withdraw, given its re-
liance on an oﬀending ﬁrm in the absence of alternative jobs and income
opportunities. Nor does litigation help to improve the relationship be-
tween the company and its stakeholders, so the hostility between the local
community and the company may render future business operations more
diﬃcult, if not impossible. Litigation thus has some potentially negative
eﬀects even for the very claimants it is designed to help.
It must also be remembered that there are considerable barriers to
justice for claimants, which result from the nature of the modern legal
process. As a survey of 154 Nigerian lawyers has shown elsewhere, claim-
ants in Africa are prevented from instituting a valid claim by the lack of
funds, ignorance of legal rights and intimidation by public bodies and
defendants (Frynas 2001). Lawsuits are also slow and the outcome is un-
certain ; for instance, the two Nigerian cases mentioned earlier took ﬁve
and nine years respectively from the start of the case until the ﬁnal appeal,
while many cases take much longer. The nature of the legal process may
therefore dissuade potential claimants and limit the potential beneﬁts of
litigation.
Litigation has an even more ambivalent developmental impact on society as a
whole. On the positive side, litigation (or rather the threat of litigation) can
pose a deterrent to potential future oﬀenders. If successful, litigation can
discourage harmful practices in the absence of strict government regula-
tions in the area of environmental and labour rights. As the international
law expert Michael Anderson (2002) noted, the award of damages ‘oﬀers
the prospect of a systemic eﬀect that should help to protect the environ-
ment by fulﬁlling the same function as regulation’. For example, asbestos-
related litigation – notably the large sum involved in the Gencor settle-
ment and the litigation in English courts – provides a much more eﬀective
deterrent to future oﬀenders than the entire South African regulation.
Indeed, successful and enforceable court judgments may be the most ef-
fective deterrent against the worst oﬀenders, who are less responsive to
activist campaigns and reputational risks (e.g. smaller Western ﬁrms or
China-based ﬁrms). In other words, litigation can help in situations where
voluntary CSR initiatives are ineﬀective. In theory, members of the society
could then hope that ﬁrms will behave more responsibly in future.
In practice, the potential for the beneﬁcial developmental impact
of litigation is limited. In cases involving tort law, courts focus on
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compensation payments to injured individuals, not on remedying long-
standing social and environmental problems. For example, the site of
former Thor Chemicals facilities in South Africa still houses some 3,500
tones of mercury wastes (Ward 2002), despite the successful litigation
against the company in the UK. Anderson (2002) argued that litigation
against TNCs could take into account environmental costs, ‘ if the com-
pensation is properly assessed and awarded’. The ﬁrm could be forced to
pay for environmentally damaging activities and could discourage similar
damaging activities elsewhere. But even if courts were to impose additional
costs on the defendants such as by the use of punitive damages, they do not
tend to look at the larger picture of environmental and social damage, and
do not investigate the necessity for clean-up operations or the costs to
future generations. Therefore, while claimants may obtain individual
compensation payments, society as a whole must still pay for environ-
mental or health-related remedial costs.
Even if legal outcomes were to provide solutions to a society’s social and
environmental problems (notably through a deterrence eﬀect), legal re-
course is limited to groups from selected countries, those with NGO sup-
port and ﬁnancial resources, and crucially depends on available legal
remedies. Litigation in Africa has so far focused on a few countries –
South Africa, Nigeria, Namibia – rather than the continent’s poorest
states. The support of international NGOs for litigants has been uneven,
focusing on South Africa and Nigeria. The available legal remedies ad-
dress some wrongs but not others. For example, a Nigerian farmer injured
by an oil spill has much better prospects of legal success than a ﬁsherman
whose ﬁshing nets were destroyed by an oil company boat, due to the fact
that the law applicable to oil spills (notably the strict liability rule) is much
more robust than legal rules on negligence (cf. Frynas 2000: ch. 6). In case
of diﬀuse environmental damage which aﬀects many sections of society
(e.g. wide-spread air pollution), there is not a single injured party with an
economic incentive or the legal standing to bring a lawsuit (Anderson
2002). In other words, litigation has a very uneven reach and does not
always address some of the most serious corporate wrongdoings in society.
In sum, the above discussion suggests that the cons of litigation far
outweigh the pros (see Table 3 for an overview), although the reality is
more complex and this analysis can only serve as a starting point for
understanding the role of litigation and diﬀerent stakeholder perspectives.
The potential economic impact of litigation is purely negative. The de-
velopmental impact is less clear-cut, but it is remarkable that litigation
does not even have unambiguous beneﬁts for the represented claimants
themselves. One might cynically conclude that the biggest beneﬁciaries
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are the lawyers who often demand hefty fees from their clients, notably in
Nigeria where lawyers frequently work on a contingency fee basis. In the
Shell v. Farah case mentioned earlier, in which the claimants were awarded
4,621,000 Naira by the court in 1994, the lawyers received roughly
2,500,000 Naira or 54% of the total compensation payment, although one
should note that a considerable part of that sum was spent on items such
as expert reports and travel (Frynas 2001). The Nigerian lawyers’ fees in
oil-related court cases may be extreme, but nonetheless underline an
additional drawback of pursuing litigation.
: : :
This article investigated the rise in social and environmental litigation
against TNCs in both domestic and foreign courts, which presents a sig-
niﬁcant development for legal systems and the parties involved. The cases
discussed above undermine legal doctrines (notably through extraterri-
torial application of law), which had previously prevented ﬁrms from
being sued, and lead to a reconﬁguration of costs and beneﬁts arising
from economic development.
In contrast to previous research on social and environmental litigation
against TNCs, this article has considered court cases against TNCs both in
T A B L E 3
Principal pros and cons of social and environmental litigation
Impact on
aﬀected ﬁrms
Impact on
national
economy
Impact on
represented
claimants
Impact on society
as a whole
Pros ’ ﬁnancial
compensation
’ satisfaction of
obtaining ‘ justice’
’ deterrence eﬀect
against future
pollution and
other adverse
corporate acts
Cons ’ higher insurance
premiums
’ higher cost of
capital
’ risk of lower
share price
’ risk of damaged
brand name
and corporate
reputation
’ potential for
reduced
foreign
investment
’ threat of withdrawal
by the key provider
of jobs and income
opportunities
’ few provisions for
remedying
long-standing
social and
environmental
problems
’ no legal recourse
for many corporate
wrong-doings
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their home countries and in host countries, which are not commonly
treated alongside one another. It does not provide a systematic compari-
son of the two fora, but one could argue that litigation in home countries is
perhaps more signiﬁcant, since compensation payments in US (and, to a
lesser extent, English or Canadian) courts tend to be higher than those in
host countries’ courts, although the Gencor settlement in South Africa
suggests that this rule may not always apply. At the same time, there is a
need to assess the desirability of litigation in US or English courts from the
point of view of Africa’s development. Peter Newell (2001: 88) suggested
that ‘ transnational litigation does nothing to build up the capacity of legal
systems in the South’. Such litigation also raises uncomfortable questions
regarding state sovereignty as well as fundamental principles of company
law. A systematic comparison of the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerent fora and
the desirability of foreign litigation goes beyond the scope of this article,
but the importance of these questions calls for further research.
As suggested at the outset, Africa is not unique in terms of the rise in
litigation against transnational corporations. But there is one compelling
reason why litigation in African courts may become more prevalent than
perhaps in Asian or Latin American courts : the British colonial legal
heritage. Until now, lawsuits in African courts have almost exclusively
focused on Common Law jurisdictions – Nigeria and South Africa –
where courts traditionally enjoy more autonomy and have greater power
to ‘ shape law’ rather than merely to interpret legal statutes. As a result of
colonial rule, much of Africa (as opposed to Latin America or Asia) is
covered by former British colonies with Common Law jurisdictions. In
addition, governments in African states tend to enjoy lower levels of social
and political control than elsewhere, and frequently lack a ﬁrm grip over
the judiciary (cf. Chazan et al. 1988: 58–9). This helps to explain why
judges occasionally pronounce judgments contrary to the interests of even
the more authoritarian regimes, such as Abacha’s Nigeria and Mugabe’s
Zimbabwe. Judicial pronouncements may have been disregarded by the
security forces or government ministers under those regimes, but it is
nonetheless signiﬁcant that they existed, in contrast to, say, Musharraf ’s
Pakistan.
Africa is by no means alone in spearheading social and environmental
litigation against private ﬁrms in the developing world. For example,
India – a stable democracy with a British legal heritage – has enjoyed a
long history of judicial activism, with the Indian Supreme Court taking a
very active role in spearheading human rights and environmental claims,
of which most African legal activists can only dream (Anderson 1998;
Jackson & Rosencranz 2003).10 But, given the British colonial heritage
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and the relative autonomy of courts in countries such as Nigeria and South
Africa, I would hazard the assertion that the potential for host country
litigation against transnational corporations is – at least in theory – greater
in Africa (or, more precisely, the former British colonies in Africa) than
elsewhere in the developing world. On the other hand, the potential for
home country litigation in US or British courts is probably not very dif-
ferent for African or Latin American litigants, as it makes relatively little
diﬀerence to a US or British court whether a case originated in Africa
or Latin America (as opposed to the nationality of the company or the
admissibility of the speciﬁc claim).
Perhaps the most pertinent question to pose is to what extent the new
legal trend towards suing TNCs for social and environmental damage will
spread further. Not surprisingly, businessmen oppose any broadening of
legal liability for social and environmental damage, most noticeably in
the United States. Many business organisations in the United States, in-
cluding the US Chamber of Commerce, have protested against ATCA,
and one observer (Rodman 2001: 225) already predicted the US Con-
gressional repeal of ATCA to prevent future court cases like those outlined
earlier.11 Indeed, the US government has already obstructed litigation
against TNCs. In July 2002, the US State Department intervened in a
lawsuit against ExxonMobil over human rights abuses in Indonesia,
alleging that the case could endanger Indonesia’s cooperation in ﬁghting
terrorism. Several months earlier, a federal judge in California dismissed
a lawsuit against Rio Tinto for alleged rights abuses in Papua New
Guinea, citing a State Department opinion that the case could adversely
aﬀect US foreign policy.12 In May 2003, the US Department of Justice
ﬁled an amicus curiae (friend of the court) brief in the Doe v. Unocal case,
arguing that the case could interfere with US foreign policy (website :
HRF). Even if claimants were to succeed in the United States, the South
African government has criticised the apartheid-related lawsuits in US
courts and has already indicated that it will not enforce judgments made in
foreign courts.13
These steps taken by governments – often after intense pressure from
industry groups and foreign governments – highlight the inherent limita-
tions of current litigation. As suggested earlier, the rise in social and en-
vironmental litigation up to this point has been driven by the autonomy of
US, English, Nigerian and other courts. The judges have so far used their
independent discretion to reexamine existing legislation and case law in
favour of claimants ; a change in legislation could undermine many of
these eﬀorts, just as more robust social and environmental legislation could
strengthen them.
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Even if the litigation against TNCs were not to be prevented by
government action, academics and practitioners should examine the costs
and beneﬁts of such a course of action. As suggested earlier, litigation may
impose new costs and risks on foreign investors in Africa as well as Africa’s
national economies and, generally, the cons of litigation far outweigh the
pros. And yet litigation can help to create checks and balances on the
activities of TNCs and help to deter potential corporate oﬀenders. As
stated at the outset, the rise of litigation is related to the absence of eﬀec-
tive global institutions, and represents one strategy of NGOs and local
communities to hold corporations accountable for the consequences of
their actions. In the creation of global governance, ﬁrms have so far been
assigned more rights than obligations. Until political leaders address this
imbalance, calls for further transnational and national litigation against
TNCs are inevitable.
Given the use of legal strategies as a means towards corporate ac-
countability, it becomes necessary to reassess the role of litigation in the
wider CSR movement. Until now, the primarily business-driven CSR
agenda has focused on ﬁrms’ voluntary measures over and above legal
requirements, or ‘voluntary restraint of proﬁt maximisation’ (to borrow
from the business guru Kenneth Andrews 1973), while carefully avoiding
any legally binding measures. In a departure from this tradition, Halina
Ward (2003) has argued that litigation should be factored into public
policy and business strategy on CSR, not least because of the many
intersections between CSR and law such as new legislation (e.g. Ghana
passed legislation to require logging companies to secure a Social Re-
sponsibility Agreement with customary land owners), or the legal nature of
some CSR initiatives (e.g. if a code of conduct by a TNC is incorporated
into a contract with a supplier, it becomes legally binding) (Ward 2003). At
the same time, there are inevitable conﬂicts between litigation as a CSR
tool and the current CSR approaches. For instance, while the current
CSR approaches call for openness and transparency of ﬁrms in social and
environmental reporting, litigation calls for companies to remain silent as
any publicly released data could be used against them in a court battle
(Ward 2001). Litigation also poses more profound challenges over the
standards of behaviour that ﬁrms should apply in diﬀerent countries, given
diﬀerent cultural contexts or diﬀerent levels of development. This touches
on the more fundamental philosophical debates between cultural re-
lativists (e.g. Brown 1999) and cultural universalists (e.g. Donaldson &
Dunfee 1999). But whatever one’s views, I hope that this article will make
a modest contribution towards the debate on the role of social and
environmental litigation in today’s global governance.
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N O T E S
1. For historical reasons, the UK has separate legal systems for England/Wales, Scotland, Northern
Ireland, the Isle of Man and Channel Islands. This article refers to the ‘English’ as opposed to the
Scottish or Irish legal systems.
2. While the sums involved were smaller than in the 2001 settlement, the compensation oﬀer in
2003 was not necessarily inferior to the previous oﬀer. Above all, the 2003 settlement only applied to
the 7,500 claimants registered in the English suit (not future claimants) ; under the terms of the 2001
settlement, the amount expected to be paid to the existing 7,500 claimants was approximately £9
million.
3. See media reports on the litigation, e.g. ‘NGO Launches US Apartheid Reparations Law Suit ’
(SAPA, 12.11.2002) ; ‘Rights : Apartheid Victims Sue Big Firms For Aiding Regime’ (IPS 12.11.2002).
4. Personal communications with Jennifer Green, staﬀ attorney at the Centre for Constitutional
Rights.
5. These ﬁgures come directly from interviews with senior lawyers working for Shell and Chevron
in Nigeria (see Frynas 1999; Frynas 2000: 182).
6. Particulars of claim in the case Manchonyane v. Duiker Mining, Johannesburg High Court.
7. The claimants dismissed Ed Fagan as counsel on the eve of a court hearing in November 2003.
8. Personal communications with Ledum Mittee. Following Ledum Mittee’s arrest by the security
forces, under General Abacha’s rule, the Farah case was handled by Lucius Nwosu who has made a
living out of oil-related litigation in Nigeria and later obtained a large portion of the ﬁnal compen-
sation award.
9. This argument relies on the assumption that oil and mining investments are beneﬁcial econ-
omically. However, a large literature including quantitative studies demonstrates that states with a
high share of natural resource exports have had lower economic growth rates than states without those
resources, and suﬀer from various negative economic and political phenomena under the label
‘resource curse’ (see e.g. Ross 1999).
10. The author is grateful to one of the referees for pointing this out.
11. The Bush administration has indicated that it would like to limit the ability of foreign nationals
to sue in US courts. This was a reaction not merely to lawsuits against US ﬁrms but also to human
rights allegations against the US government. Notably, ATCA has been employed by a group of
Guantanamo Bay detainees captured in Afghanistan. See Dan Eggen & Charles Lane, ‘Bush seeks to
restrict foreign nationals’ suits ’ (Washington Post 2.6.2003). Nonetheless, even if US federal law is altered
or repealed, it is still possible that companies could be sued under state law provisions (I am thankful to
Halina Ward for pointing this out to me).
12. The case involved alleged human rights abuses by ExxonMobil at its gas ﬁelds in the Indonesian
province of Aceh. At ExxonMobil’s request, the judge in the case asked the State Department whether
the case could adversely aﬀect US interests. The Rio Tinto case arose from the company’s operations
at the Bougainville copper mine in Papua New Guinea. See ‘Oily Diplomacy’ (New York Times
19.8.2002).
13. See South Africa’s Trade and Industry Minister Alec Erwin, reported in Ginger Thompson,
‘South Africa to Pay $3,900 to Each Family of Apartheid Victims’ (New York Times 16.4.2003).
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